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THE LAW OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN OHIO
I. INTRODUCTION
HE OHIO SUPREME COURT HAS RECENTLY REAFFIRMED the retention of
interspousal immunity in Ohio. In Varholla v. Varholla,l a wife brought a
negligence action against her husband for injuries she suffered as a result of an
automobile accident. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed a summary
judgment in favor of the defendant husband on the ground that one cannot
bring a negligence suit against his or her spouse when the parties are living
together as husband and wife at the time of the injury. However, two recent
cases decided by the Eighth and Eleventh District Courts of Appeals have
allowed suits between spouses under certain circumstances. In Resmondo v.
Martin,2 the Eleventh District Court of Appeals held that the estate of a
deceased wife could maintain a wrongful death action against the husband
where the wife's death had resulted from an alleged beating on the part of the
husband. In Kobe v. Kobe,3 a wife who had divorced her husband was
allowed to sue him for injuries sustained during coverture, where the
husband's alleged beating had caused her injuries.
The purpose of this note will be to discuss Ohio's current position on
interspousal immunity as well as the problems that are created by the
retention of that doctrine.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 4
At common law a woman's identity became merged with her husband's
upon marriage, and husband and wife were viewed by the law as one.5 Along
with her identity, a woman lost her capacity to own and dispose of property,
to contract, and to sue and be sued.6 If a wife was injured, her husband would
sue on her behalf; if, on the other hand, she should injure another, only her
husband would be liable. As a result, a suit between husband and wife in
essence was a suit by the husband against himself.7 These common law
infirmities were remedied by the passage of Married Women's Acts8 which
1 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 383 N.E.2d 888 (1978).
2 No. 75-844 (Ohio 11th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1975).
3 61 Ohio App. 2d 67, - N.E.2d - (8th Dist. 1978.
4 For a general summary of the historical background of the doctrine of interspousal
immunity, see F. HAnPm & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.10 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971); McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VtLu L. REv. 303
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Torts Between Spouses]; McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in
Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030 (1930); Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family,
9 VAND. L. REv. 823 (1956); Sullivan, Intra-Family Immunities and the Law of Torts in Ohio,
18 WEST. RE. L. REV. 447 (1967).
5 W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 859.
Id. Indeed, the very legal existence of the wife was regarded as suspended for the duration
of the marriage.
Id. at 860.
'See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.09 (Page 1956): "A married woman may sue and be
sued as if she were unmarried, and her husband may be joined with her only when the cause of
action is in favor of or against both." See also id. § 2307.10: "When husband and wife are sued
together, the wife may defend for her own right; and if the husband neglects to defend she may
also defend for his right."
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allowed a married woman to own and dispose of property, to contract, and to
sue and be sued over these property and contract rights;9 the statutes
destroyed the common law unity of husband and wife.10 Currently Married
Women's Acts are in effect in all fifty states as well as in the District of
Columbia.
The enactment of these statutes raised the question whether one spouse
could sue the other not only to enforce contract and property rights, but to
recover for personal injuries as well. In 1910 this question was presented to the
United States Supreme Court in Thompson v. Thompson," a case involving
the interpretation of the District of Columbia's Married Women's Act. The
Court followed the general rule of narrowly construing statutes that abrogate
the common law and held that because the statute did not specifically allow a
wife to sue her husband for personal injuries, the common law rule that a wife
could not sue her husband in tort still applied.' 2 Other reasons for the court's
holding were that marital harmony would be disrupted by allowing suits for
personal injury between husband and wife, and that there were adequate
remedies under the divorce and criminal laws.' 3
By the middle of the twentieth century, a number of courts began to take
positions contrary to that of the Thompson Court and held that the Married
Women's Acts did in fact allow suits for personal injuries between husband
and wife. 14 In 1952 Ohio joined this growing minority 15 of states. In Damm v.
Elyria Lodge No. 46516 the Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio's Married
'W. PRossER, supra note 4, at 861. These statutes began to be enacted about 1844. They were
also referred to as Emancipation Acts.
10 Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952). See text
accompanying notes 20 & 21 infra.
1 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
12 Id. at 618-19. The court's decision was premised on the contention that while these acts
conferred additional rights on married women, it was not the legislative intention to revolutionize
the law governing the relation of husband and wife between themselves.
13 Id.
14 The trend was to first allow interspousal suits when an intentional tort was involved, later
extending the ability to sue to negligent torts, as can be seen by the following chronology of cases:
Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914) (intentional torts); Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124,
140 P. 1022 (1914) (intentional torts); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 A. 657 (1915) (intentional
torts); Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917) (intentional torts); Crowell v. Crowell,
180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206, reh. denied, 181 N.C. 66,106 S.E. 149 (1920) (intentional torts); Prosser
v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1920) (intentional torts); Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N.C. 566,
118 S.E. 9 (1923) (negligent operation of an automobile); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583,131
A. 432 (1925) (negligent operation of an automobile); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475
(1926) (negligent operation of an automobile); Penton v. Penton, 223 Ala. 282, 135 So. 481 (1931)
(negligent operation of an automobile); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526
(1932) (negligent operation of an automobile); Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129,166 S.E. 101 (1932)
(negligent operation of an automobile); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19,46 P.2d 740 (1935) (negligent
operation of an automobile); Mitlimore v. Milford Motor Co., 89 N.H. 272, 197 A. 330 (1938)
(negligent operation of an automobile); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938)
(negligent operation of an automobile); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941)
(negligent operation of an automobile); Lorang v. Hayes, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949)
(international torts). See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2D 632, 647-51 (1955).
15 Annot., 43 A.L.R.2D 632,650 (1955); McCurdy, Torts Between Spouses, supra note 4, at 319;
Sullivan, supra note 4, at 457.
16 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952).
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Women's Acts 7 abolished the unity of husband and wife and permitted a
wife to maintain an action for personal injuries caused by her husband. Just
slightly over four months before, in Signs v. Signs,"8 the Ohio Supreme Court
had abrogated parent-child immunity for personal injury suits. The court had
noted in Signs that the only distinguishable feature between parent-child
immunity and interspousal immunity was the common law unity of husband
and wife; such unity did not exist between parent and child.' 9 Therefore, once
the court was to decide that this unity no longer existed between husband and
wife, the door would be open for the court to dispose of interspousal
immunity in the same manner that it had disposed of parent-child immunity.
In Damm v. Elyria Lodge a woman brought a negligence action against an
unincorporated association. Since the defendant was unincorporated, the
wife's ability to maintain the suit could only be based on her ability to
maintain a suit against each of the individual members of the association.
However, because the plaintiff's husband had been a member of the
association at the time of the alleged injury, the trial court dismissed the action
on the grounds of interspousal immunity. The precise question on appeal was
"the right of a wife to recover damages for a tort committed by her
husband. ... 20 The Ohio Supreme Court held that because the Married
Women's Act had abrogated the common law unity of husband and wife, the
Act authorized a suit by a wife against her husband for his torts; consequently,
the plaintiff had standing to sue the defendant association.21
In the past two decades an increasing number of states have joined the
trend of abolishing interspousal immunity, and the minority has now become
the majority.22 States have abolished interspousal immunity in varying
degrees: some have limited suits between husbands and wives to wilful or
intentional torts;23 most have abolished it for negligence as well. 24 The three
17 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.09-.10 (Page 1956), printed in full at note 8 supra.
's 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
19 Id. at 569, 103 N.E.2d at 747.
20 158 Ohio St. at 113, 107 N.E.2d at 340-41.
21 Id. at 121,107 N.E.2d at 344. This position has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases; see Le
Crone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 135, 201 N.E.2d 533, 539 (10th Dist. 1963);
Lowman v. Lowman, 166 Ohio St. 1, 9-10, 139 N.E.2d 1, 6-7 (1956).
22 Casey, The Trend of Interspousal and Parental Immunity - Cakewalk Liability, 45 INs.
COUNSEL J. 321, 322 (1978).
23 Lusby v. Lusby, 390 A.2d 77 (Md. Ct. App. 1978); Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242, 287 P.2d
585 (1955).
24 The following is a list of states which have abolished interspousal immunity for negligence
actions: Alabama - Penton v. Penton, 223 Ala. 282, 135 So. 481 (1931); Alaska - Cramer v.
Cramer, 379 P.2d (Alaska 1963); Arkansas - Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599,300 S.W.2d 15 (1957);
California - Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Colorado -
Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Connecticut - Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn.
583, 13 A. 432 (1925); Idaho - Lorang v. Hayes, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Indiana -
Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16,284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Kentucky - Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d
480 (Ky. 1953); Massachusetts - Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 1976); Minnesota -
Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Nebraska - Imig v. March, 203 Neb.
537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979); Nevada - Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397,527 P.2d 1013 (1974); New
Hampshire - Morin v. Le Tourneau, 102 N.H. 309,156 A.2d 131 (1959); New Jersey- Immer v.
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970); New Mexico - Maestras v. Overton, 87 N.M. 213, 531
P.2d 947 (1975); New York - N.Y. GEN. OBLIC. LAw § 3-313 (McKinney 1978); North Carolina -
Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9 (1923); North Dakota - Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice,
62 N.D. 191,242 N.W. 526 (1932); Oklahoma - Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395,87 P.2d 660
1979]
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most recent states to drop the doctrine of interspousal immunity are Nebraska
and West Virginia, where it was abrogated completely,25 and Maryland,
where immunity for "outrageous intentional torts" was abrogated.2 6 One
state, Illinois, when its highest court abrogated interspousal immunity,27
reinstituted it through legislation. 28 Not only a majority of states, but many
commentators as well, support abrogation of interspousal immunity.2 9
III. THE INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNrrY DoCRINE IN OHIO
In the 1965 case of Lyons v. Lyons, 30 the Ohio Supreme Court retreated
from the position it had taken in Damm v. Elyria Lodge. In Lyons a man
brought suit against his wife for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result
of her negligent operation of an automobile. The court affirmed a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff's wife on the grounds that the doctrine of interspousal
immunity barred the suit. The court cited three justifications to support its
conclusion: 1) permitting such a suit would foster marital disharmony
contrary to public policy;3' 2) in the case where the defendant is insured, such
a suit may foster fraud and collusion as well as encourage raids upon the
insurance companies; 32 and 3) because interspousal immunity represents the
public policy of the state, any change should be left to the legislature.3 3 The
court was able to distinguish Damm v. Elyria Lodge because that case
involved a suit against an unincorporated association rather than an individual
husband, and, therefore, the policy reasons favoring interspousal immunity
did not apply.34 However, the court's holding was limited to negligence
actions where the injury occurred while the parties were living together as
man and wife. 35
Recently the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed Lyons. In Varholla v.
(1938); South Carolina - Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932); South Dakota -
Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53,298 N.W. 266 (1941); Vermont - Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98,
300 A.2d 637 (1973); Virginia - Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971); Wash-
ington - Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183,500 P.2d 771 (1972); West Virginia - Coffindaffer v.
Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978); Wisconsin - Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202,209 N.W.
475 (1926).
25 Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244
S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978).
21 Lusby v. Lusby, 390 A.2d 77 (Md. Ct. App. 1978).
27 Brandtv. Keller, 413 Ill. 503,109 N.E.2d 729 (1953). The court liberally construed the state's
Married Women's Act establishing the separate identity of a married woman in all litigation to
include all actions against all persons, including her husband.
28 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959). The Illinois legislature added the following
language to the Illinois Married Women's Act: "[N]either husband nor wife may sue the other for
a tort to the person committed during coverture."
29 See authorities cited in note 4 supra.
30 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965).
31 Id. at 244, 208 N.E.2d at 535.
32 Id. at 245, 208 N.E.2d at 535.
33 Id. at 247, 208 N.E.2d at 537.
34 Id. at 245-46, 208 N.E.2d at 536.
- The syllabus of the court states: "A spouse may not maintain an action against the other
spouse for personal injuries resulting from the negligence of the other spouse where the married
parties are living together as husband and wife at the time of the alleged injury." Id. at 243,208
N.E.2d at 534 (syllabus).
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Varholla,36 a woman brought an action against her husband for injuries
allegedly sustained as a result of his negligent operation of an automobile. In a
per curiam opinion the court rejected a request to reconsider its position on
interspousal immunity and instead reiterated the three policy reasons which
supported the Lyons opinion. However, one fact should be noted: in Varholla
the plaintiff had alleged that she and her husband were having "marital
difficulties" and she had filed for divorce twice before the date she brought the
action.3 The fact that the parties were having marital difficulties may obviate
both the policy against fostering marital disharmony and the policy against
fraudulent and collusive suits. If the marriage has already broken up, there is
no longer any marital harmony to promote; furthermore, there would no
longer be the close relationship that would lead to collusion against the
insurance company. One Ohio court has recognized this distinction and
allowed a husband to bring a negligence action against his wife where the
parties had separated and a divorce was pending.3
Recently two cases in the Ohio courts of appeals have carved exceptions
into interspousal immunity. In Resmondo v. Martin39 the executor of a wife's
estate brought a wrongful death action against the husband alleging that the
wife's death was the result of the husband's beating. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the husband, but the Eleventh District Court of
Appeals reversed. The executor's right to maintain the action was derivative
of the deceased's right to bring an action had she survived, and interspousal
immunity would have barred such an action by the deceased. 40 Nevertheless,
the court held that the executor of one's estate could bring an action against
the surviving spouse notwithstanding the doctrine of interspousal immunity.
The court indicated that the policies behind interspousal immunity all but
disappeared in the case of wilful torts.41 Although the court's holding was
limited to the right of the executor to bring the action, 42 there are broad dicta
to indicate that the wife could have maintained the action as well had she
survived.43
A more recent case, Kobe v. Kobe,44 also involved an alleged wife beating.
This time the wife survived but not without suffering serious and permanent
injuries. After obtaining a divorce, the wife brought an action for assault and
battery against her ex-husband. The trial court denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss, and the defendant appealed. The Eighth District Court of Appeals
held that interspousal immunity did not apply to suits for intentional torts
where the parties had divorced prior to the commencement of the action. As
in Resmondo, the court held that the policies behind interspousal immunity
36 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 383 N.E.2d 888 (1978).
7 Varholla v. Varholla, Brief of Appellant at 4.
31 Markley v. Closson, 25 Ohio Misc. 87,89,266 N.E.2d 264,266 (C.P. Richland County 1970).
'9 No. 75-844 (Ohio llth Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1975).
40 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1976).
41 No. 75-844, slip op. at 4.
42 Id. at 6.
43 Id. at 7.
44 61 Ohio App. 2d 67, - N.E.2d - (8th Dist. 1978).
1979]
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announced in Lyons had little relevance to the facts of the case.4 However,
because the holding was limited to suits brought by former spouses for
intentional torts, the court left the matter unclear as to whether this exception
to interspousal immunity was based on the fact the parties were divorced or
the fact that an intentional tort was committed. In cases involving intentional
torts, there is little problem with this unanswered question because usually the
injured spouse will obtain a divorce. However, still unanswered is the
question whether a spouse may sue the other spouse for negligence after
obtaining a divorce. 46
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE OHIO POsrrION ON INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY
A. Interspousal Immunity Does Not Effectuate Its Policies
The direction the law of interspousal immunity is taking in Ohio is
uncertain. There are two factors in both Resmondo and Kobe which
distinguish those cases from Lyons and Varholla. The first factor is that in both
Resmondo and Kobe the marriage relationship had come to an end, either by
death or divorce. The second factor is that both cases involved wilful, rather
than negligent, torts. It is not clear which of these two factors is the key one in
distinguishing Resmondo and Kobe from Lyons and Varholla. Nevertheless,
whether the distinguishing factor is the marital status of the parties or the
degree of culpability, such a distinction would be inconsistent with the goals
of tort law and the promotion of marital harmony.
The major goal of tort law is to compensate the victim rather than punish
the tortfeasor.47 Yet the distinction made between negligent and wilful torts
completely ignores the policy of compensation. It allows an injured spouse to
recover for a few cuts and scratches wilfully inflicted by the other spouse, yet
it denies any recovery whatsoever to a spouse who has been crippled for life in
an automobile accident caused by his or her mate. The one who most needs
compensation is not entitled to it.
Recognizing a distinction between suits brought before and after the
dissolution of a marriage presents problems as well. If the marriage is already
broken, as is the case with most wilful tort actions,48 there is no problem;
however, by allowing negligence actions only after dissolution of the
marriage, the law may be promoting marital break-ups. A marriage may
become unstable where one spouse has negligently injured the other. The
marriage may be able to be saved, but if recovery for the injuries can only be
obtained if the couple divorces, then the balance of this shaky marriage may
4 Id. at 70, - N.E.2d at.
41 The plaintiff in Varholla attempted to obtain a divorce after the accident. However, no
decree had been granted, and the parties were still married at the time the suit was filed. Varholla
v. Varholla, Brief of Appellant at 3-4.
17 Prosser describes the goal of tort law as follows:
There remains a body of law which is directed toward the compensation of individuals,
rather than the public, for losses which they have suffered in respect of all their legally
recognized interests, rather than one interest only, where the law considers that
compensation is required. This is the law of torts.
W. POssER, supra note 4, at 6.
48 See text accompanying notes 39-46 supra.
[Vol. 28:115
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be tipped and the marital relationship dissolved. Thus the public policy of
fostering marital harmony would be defeated.
Not only do the exceptions carved into the doctrine of interspousal
immunity create problems, the doctrine itself creates problems. The three
policies announced by the Ohio Supreme Court as justifications for the
retention of the doctrine are not relevant to the conditions of today. Lawsuits
between spouses will not disrupt marital harmony unless it has already been
disrupted.49 In most automobile negligence actions the defendant spouse will
be insured, and there will be no disruption of marital life. If a spouse sues an
uninsured spouse (for either wilful conduct or negligence), the filing of a
lawsuit indicates the marriage has already broken up. Where a spouse sues his
or her partner seeking his or her assets rather than peacefully settling the
dispute, there is no marital harmony to promote.
Furthermore, denying an injured spouse recovery, especially where
recovery can be had from an insurance company, may tend to break up the
marriage rather than safeguard it. Hospital bills are rapidly rising these days,
and if a spouse is seriously injured, the family may run into extreme financial
hardship. In view of the fact that financial hardship is a major factor in
divorce,5 0 the denial of recovery may very well lead to divorce and thereby
defeat the policy of promoting marital harmony.
Finally, Ohio's Married Women's Property Act5' has always allowed suits
between spouses in contracts and personal property claims. There is little
justification in allowing a wife a tort action for her husband's conversion of a
hundred dollar bank account while prohibiting a tort action against him for
serious and crippling injuries. The personal injury suit should not create any
more disharmony than the conversion suit.5 2
The policy of preventing collusion and fraud does not justify interspousal
immunity. A husband and wife may be more likely to collude because of the
closeness of their relationship, but this close relationship exists between
parent and child, brother and sister, or for that matter even between a couple
living together. There is no immunity recognized for them, and apparently
there is no great fear of fraud or collusion.3 In addition, our adversary system
of justice is designed to weed out fraudulent and collusive claims. 54 With
liberal discovery rules, the ability to vigorously cross-examine witnesses and
the use of skillful counsel by insurance companies, there can be little fear of
fraud escaping the courts' eyes. 55
It is claimed that where insurance is involved, a suit between a husband
11 As Justice W. Brown, dissenting in Varholla, stated: "Marital harmony either exists or it does
not. The harmonious marriage will not be hurt by allowing one spouse to benefit from the
insurance coverage of the other; and the unhappy marriage will not be helped by denying legal
rights to an already disgruntled spouse." 56 Ohio St. 2d at 273,383 N.E.2d at 891 (Brown, W., J.,
dissenting).
50 See Cutright, Income and Family Events: Marital Stability, 33 J. MAIA. & FAM. 291 (1971).
51 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.9-.10 (Page 1956), printed in full at note 8 supra.
52 Sullivan, supra note 4, at 476; Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611,623 (1902) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
See Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 576, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (1952).
54 See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962).
Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 342-43 (W. Va. 1978). However:
1979]
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and wife would involve only one real party. 56 However, most insurance
contracts (at least in automobile insurance) require that the insured cooperate
in defending any action as a condition to indemnification. The insurance
company has protected itself from attempts at fraud or collusion. If an insured
party's admission of fault is fraudulent, it can be exposed through the
adversary process. If it is not fraudulent, there should be no cause to
complain.
The Ohio Supreme Court has made a sad commentary on our adversary
system of justice by maintaining that the possibility of fraud and collusion
justifies the doctrine of interspousal immunity.57 The real tragedy lies in the
fact that the state's highest court has such little faith in the judicial system it
represents.
Finally, the insurance companies can insulate themselves from fraud
through family or household exclusion provisions. Many policies already
contain such provisions,5 and generally where there is no such provision, the
rates are higher. The problem presented here is that the existence of family or
household exclusion provisions may be inconsistent with the abrogation of
interspousal immunity. The insurance companies themselves would be
overturning the law.59 Some states have specifically prohibited such clauses. 60
The argument that the abrogation of interspousal immunity should be left
to the legislature can be dealt with quite briefly: because interspousal
immunity is a judicially created doctrine, it may be judicially abolished.6'
Furthermore, legislative silence does not mean that the legislature favors
retaining interspousal immunity. There was legislative silence during the
There may be those desperate couples who would conclude that the prospect of a
substantial monetary recovery is worth the pain of self-inflicted injuries. One can hardly
imagine that the legal system will break down with cases brought by spouses who have
flung themselves down the cellar steps or permitted the other spouse to strike them with
the family car in order to achieve the type of substantial injury that makes jury litigation
worthwhile.
Id. at 342-43.
50 Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 245, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535-36 (1965).
11 The Supreme Court of West Virginia succinctly pointed out:
We do an injustice not only to the intelligence of jurors, but to the efficacy of the
adversary system, when we express undue concern over the quantum of collusive or
meritless law suits. There is, to be sure, a difference between the ability to file a suit and
to achieve a successful result. It is upon the anvil of litigation that the merit of a case is
finally determined. Forged in the heat of trial, few but the meritorious survive.
Coffindaffer v. Coffindaifer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343 (W. Va. 1978).
58 Insurance firms such as Aetna Insurance Co., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
and MFA Mutal Insurance Co. all have automobile policies with household exclusion clauses.
Ashdown, Intrafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the Family Exclusion Clause, 60 IOwA
L. REv. 239, 254 n.96 (1974).
-' Id. at 255. Many courts, however, have upheld these exclusionary provisions. See, e.g., Senn
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 287 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1956).
60 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 632.34(3) (West Special Pamphlet 1979). Minnesota had also outlawed
family exclusions before it adopted its no fault insurance law of 1975. MIuN. STAT. ANN. § 65 B.23
(West Supp. 1974) (repealed 1975). See also N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
61 Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 273, 383 N.E.2d 888, 891 (1978) (Brown, W., J.,
dissenting); Markley v. Closson, 25 Ohio Misc. 87, 90, 266 N.E.2d 264, 266-67 (C.P. Richland
County 1970). See also Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 518,105 S.E. 210 (1920), where the court
said that common law concepts which come from a "barbarous age," such as the unity of husband
and wife, need no longer be followed.
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period after the decision abolishing immunity in Damm v. Elyria Lodge.
Silence on the part of the legislature does not indicate agreement with the
judiciary as much as it indicates a willingness on the legislature's part to leave a
particular matter up to the judiciary. The legislature's silence while the
judiciary has wavered over this doctrine indicates such a willingness.
There have been other justifications advanced for the doctrine of
interspousal immunity which have not been used by the Ohio Supreme Court
in its decisions. One is that there are remedies available in the divorce and
criminal courts for injured spouses.62 However, these remedies are clearly
inadequate.63 Only certain awards may be made in a divorce proceeding, and
these may not necessarily include compensation for personal injuries to an
aggrieved spouse .6 The non-compensatory aspect of criminal remedies is
obvious.6 5
One final justification is that recovery between spouses in a case where the
wrongdoer is insured may benefit the wrongdoer. Such an argument is
inconsistent with the policies of tort law which look toward compensating the
victim rather than punishing the wrongdoer.6 6 In addition the so-called
"benefit" to the tortfeasor was paid for; he or she is entitled to the benefit of his
or her bargain with the insurance company.
B. Constitutional Problems
Notwithstanding the problems with interspousal immunity discussed
above, the doctrine may also be unconstitutional under both the United States
and Ohio constitutions. 7 Both of these provide for the equal protection of the
laws. 68 In Primes v. Tyler,69 the Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio's Guest
Statute70 violated the equal protection provisions of the United States and
Ohio constitutions. The provisions of the Guest Statute are similar to the
doctrine of interspousal immunity insofar as the statute renders a host driver
immune from negligence suits brought by the injured guest passengers in his
or her car. The justifications for the statute were that it promoted hospitality
62 Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 619 (1902).
63 W. PnossEa, supra note 4, at 862; Note, Husband and Wife Are Not One: The Marital
Relationship in Tort Law, 43 UMKC L. REV. 334, 337-38 (1975).
64 See OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page Supp. 1978). Although alimony awards are to be
based on equitable grounds, personal injuries suffered at the hands of the other spouse are not
included in the listed factors.
'- W. PaOSSER, supra note 4, at 862.
'6 One commentator noted that "[tihe argument that the husband should not share in the
benefits of the judgement and in effect be awarded for his own wrong is consistent with
traditional notions of tort." Note, supra note 63, at 338. Nevertheless, the author concludes that
this "argument lacks any foundation in logic."
67 Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 273, 383 N.E.2d 888, 891 (1978) (Brown, W., J.,
dissenting).
68 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; OHIO CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
69 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975).
70 OHso REV. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (Page 1973):
The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall
not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest, resulting from
the operation of said motor vehicle, unless such injuries or death are caused by the wilful
or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation
of said motor vehicle.
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and prevented collusive suits. Applying a rational basis test, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the statute did not suitably further these objectives
and therefore violated the equal protection clauses of the United States and
Ohio constitutions.7 The objectives of the Guest Statute and of interspousal
immunity are similar: both seek to promote a particular social relationship,
and both seek to prevent fraudulent and collusive law suits. As stated above,
72
these objectives are furthered no more by interspousal immunity than they are
by the Guest Statute. For the same reasons stated in Primes v. Tyler
interspousal immunity should be declared unconstitutional. One federal court
has so held.7 3
Because the fundamental right of the family relationship is involved,74 a
higher standard of review may be required. The doctrine of interspousal
immunity denies a class of people relief because of the existence of the marital
relationship, and consequently it infringes upon that relationship. When a
state infringes upon fundamental rights, it violates the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution unless there is a compelling state interest and
no narrower means to achieve that interest.7 Both the promotion of marital
harmony and the prevention of fraud can be attained in a less intrusive
manner than interspousal immunity. The doctrine is overinclusive because it
prohibits spouses who would not divorce or commit fraud upon the insurance
company from bringing a suit against the other spouse. It is underinclusive as
well because it does not effectively eliminate marital disharmony - in fact it
may further it - nor is it a very effective safeguard against fraudulent suits.
Since the doctrine does not employ means narrowly tailored to fit its ends, it
violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.7 6
The doctrine of interspousal immunity raises due process questions as
well. Without granting a spouse an opportunity to be heard, it creates an
irrebuttable presumption that the spouse and his or her partner will perpetrate
a fraud upon the court. Such irrebuttable presumptions have been held to be
7143 Ohio St. 2d at 205,331 N.E.2d at 729 (1975). However, the United States Supreme Court
had reached a different result. See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929). More recently the United
States Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a case which affirmed the constitutionality of a
guest statute. See Sidle v. Majors, 536 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 945 (1976).
Nevertheless, a growing number of courts is declaring guest statutes to be unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855,506 P.2d 212,106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); Thompson v. Hagan,
96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bander, 213 Kan. 751,518 P.2d 362 (1974); Manistee
Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975); Laakonen v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 91 Nev. 506,538 P.2d 574 (1975); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.
1974) (decided on state grounds); McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975).
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has been willing to strike down legislation
previously upheld by a three-judge district court under a rational basis test where apprehension
of fraud and collusion is the justification for the legislation. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S.
628 (1974).
712 See pages 120-23 supra.
73 Alexander v. Alexander, 140 F. Supp. 925, 928 (W.D.S.C. 1956): "The Constitution and
laws of the United States recognize that a married woman is a person and an individual and that
she is entitled to the same protection of the law as other individuals regardless of ancient pro-
visions of the common law."
74 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,383-87 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
75 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
16 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390 (1978).
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unconstitutional,77 especially where the right to be heard in court is
concerned.78 It would not be unduly burdensome upon the courts of Ohio to
give a litigant the opportunity to try his case; as stated earlier, our adversary
system is well equipped to weed out fraudulent and collusive claims. Finally
interspousal immunity violates due process under the Ohio Constitution
79
because it closes the courts and denies a remedy by due course of law to a
spouse who wishes to sue his or her partner.
8 0
V. CONCLUSION
States that retain the doctrine of interspousal immunity are part of a
shrinking minority. As has been seen, there are compelling explanations for
this trend. Although historically the doctrine may have served a useful
purpose and may have accurately reflected the values of society, this is no
longer true. Currently the doctrine is inconsistent with the goals of tort law
which are designed to compensate the injured. Marital status cannot be
determinative of the remedy available to redress the injury. In this respect the
doctrine is inconsistent with recent developments in the law of torts which are
moving away from a system based on fault to one based on compensation.
The reasons that have been used to justify the doctrine have all but
disappeared. Overriding policy concerns of promoting marital harmony and
preventing fraud upon insurance companies are not adequately served by this
doctrine. Marriages in modem society are subject to a variety of stresses;
interspousal lawsuits would certainly be minor compared to the economic
and social pressures already in action. In fact, the financial hardships created
by the doctrine undoubtedly outweigh the minimal risks of strife that it is
designed to prevent. A recognition of these factors opposing the continuation
of the doctrine has already caused it to become riddled with judicially
created exceptions, and, if it is retained in Ohio, the exceptions will continue
to proliferate. This slow death of the doctrine will lead to more litigation and
confusion. The courts will bear the burden of this approach in the long run. It
would behoove them to relieve this burden by giving the doctrine of
interspousal immunity the quick burial in Ohio that it has been given in most
other jurisdictions.
JAMES L. DEESE
7 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441
(1973); Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 202, 331 N.E.2d 723, 728 (1974); see Varholla v.
Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 275, 383 N.E.2d 888, 892 (1978) (Brown, W., J., dissenting).
18 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
71 OMo CONsr. art. I, § 16: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in
his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have
justice administered without denial or delay."
8o Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 205, 331 N.E.2d 723, 729 (1975).
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